We propose an auction system implemented via V2I devices to toll and allocate traffic.
traffic density in certain parts of the link is high). However, if links are short, and time is 141 properly discretized (see section 2.3.3), maintaining link flow below C l during the planning 142 duration can maintain travel time at T l .
143
A path is defined as a sequence of links from one origin to one destination. The set of 144 all possible paths is denoted by P = {1, 2, . . . , P }. We denote a path p ∈ P as a sequence 
Vehicles

149
There are N vehicles, denoted by set N = {1, 2, . . . , N }, using the traffic network. Vehicle i ∈ N will enter the network at time A i .
151
The traffic controller's job is to assign a path to each vehicle. The path assignment for 
154
Each vehicle has a utility function U i (x i ) that maps a valid assignment x i to a real 155 number:
It can be interpreted as the benefit vehicle i gets when traveling under assignment x i .
Time
160
The entire planning period is discretized into a set of intervals of equal length δ, denoted as 161 T = {1, 2, . . . , T }. δ is set small enough so that the travel time of any link in the network 162 is an integer multiple of δ, but not too small so as to make the problem computationally 163 difficult (issues of computation will be discussed in section 5 ).
164
The typical planning period δT can be set to 24 hours, or to the duration of the peak 165 hours when congestion is likely to happen. 
Optimization Problem
167
Given a path assignment matrix for all drivers, x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ), and the bidsv j i for vehicle i and path j, we evaluate the system performance using the sum of the utility of all vehicles (also called social utility function) U:
Assuming that all links are congestion free, we define the following delay operator τ 
Constraint (1) cluded.
192
We modify the optimization problem (MAX 1) to exclude vehicle k, and call it (MAX 193 1-k). Let its optimal value to be U * −k . Thus :
Thus U * −k is the optimal social utility when vehicle k is not in the system.
195
If we denote x * −k as the optimal solution from (MAX 1), excluding vehicle k, then the toll π k for vehicle k is
The first term in equation (7), is the optimal social utility without vehicle k, and the 196 second term is the social utility of the optimal solution x * of (MAX 1), without the vehicle 197 k. The difference of these two terms is the increase in social utility when vehicle k is not 198 included in the system, justifying it as a toll for vehicle k.
199
Note that the first term depends only on the bids of vehicles other than k. This is the ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ P).
202
Theorem 2.1. Truthful reporting is an optimal strategy for each vehicle driver in the auc-203 tion mechanism. Moreover, when each vehicle driver reports truthfully, the outcome of the 204 mechanism is one that maximizes social utility.
205
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is in section 7.1. 
An Example
208
We test this model on the traffic network shown in FIGURE 2.
209
There are six links in this network. The free flow travel time T l of each link l is shown in 210 a box next to it. The free flow capacity C l is also shown as a red number attached to link l.
211
We set up the number T l such that four paths have different free flow travel time: 8 for
212
Path ABCD, 9 for ACD, 10 for ABD, and 13 for ACBD. This makes the interaction of path 213 choice and toll transparent.
214
To better understand the dynamic of traffic assignment and toll price, we assume that 215 all vehicles are traveling only from A to D.
216
We assume that the number of vehicles arriving at the entrance follows a Poisson distri-217 bution with rate λ. Note that λ can be a function of time.
218
We assume vehicles' value v The parameters of this test are shown in Table 1 
228
We generate input data according to the settings described above, and solve the path assign- We now analyze the traffic flow on each path over time in FIGURE 3. 
FIGURE 3 Number of Vehicles Using Each Path
As is shown in FIGURE 3, at the beginning when traffic is low, all of the traffic goes 234 through the shortest two paths: ABCD and ACD. As traffic flow increases over time, more 235 and more vehicles are assigned to longer paths.
236
At the same time, FIGURE 4 shows that the toll price also goes up as the traffic flow 237 increases over time. Also the toll is higher for shorter path, and lower for longer path.
238
We also analyze the traffic flow of each link during the 60 minutes test period. As is 
Rolling Horizon
293
The current auction is operated off-line, meaning that all vehicles bid and get the assigned 294 paths before starting travel. This limits the usability of the model. However, one can extend 295 this model to a rolling horizon reservation system. In this system, we set up a main auction 296 labeled B 0 which has a "cut-off" time, say, two hours before the start of planning period.
297
Every vehicle that bids before this cut-off time will receive the path assignment and payment 298 information immediately at the cut-off time. Vehicles who miss the cut-off time can still bid 299 upon arrival at the entrance by participating in the following "rolling" auction:
300
The traffic controller will start a new round of auction B t at every time period t ∈ T.
301
Vehicles arriving between time t − 1 and t who did not bid before the cut-off time can integer solution.
Structure of The Path Assignment Problem
321
Consider the constraints of the LP relaxation of (MAX 1).
The problem has N × P variables. There are N constraints in the first group of constraints 
327
The proof of Theorem 2 is in section 7.2.
328
In the worst case, there will be at most 2T L non-integer variables in a solution to the 329 LP relaxation of (MAX 1). In general, the proportion of non-integer solutions is 2T L/N P .
330
In large network, T N and L P , so only a small percentage of variables will be non-
331
integer. In the test case of section 3, at most (60 × 4)/(5100 × 4) = 1.18% of variables will 332 be non-integer. Although the initial path assignment problem (MAX 1) may itself be hard to solve, bigger 339 computational challenge is to solve N instances of payment problems (MAX 1-k).
340
As is shown in (22) , in order to maintain truthful reporting property of VCG mechanism, signed the same path, they pay the same toll (See Theorem 3). This can be used to reduce 347 running time of our mechanism: instead of solving payment problem for each vehicle, we 348 solve payment problem (MAX 1-k) only once for each time step and each path. .
415
For case 1, the change of objective value ∆U −k 1 is
For case 2, the change of objective value ∆U −k 2 is
Thus, according to assumption 5
>0
This means at least one of ∆U −k 1 or ∆U −k 2 must be positive. So it is always possible to
